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Opportunities and Challenges in 
Tanzania’s Sugar Industry: 
Lessons for SAGCOT and the 
New Alliance
Executive summary
Sugarcane outgrower schemes are central to 
several policy and donor strategies for driving 
agricultural growth and reducing poverty, 
including the Southern Agricultural Growth 
Corridor project in Tanzania (SAGCOT). But 
field research into the outgrower component 
of Kilombero Sugar Company, Tanzania’s 
largest and best regarded sugar producer, 
demonstrates a pressing need for change. 
Sugarcane production in Kilombero has had 
benefits for farming households as well as 
the local and national economy. However, 
unsustainable expansion and governance issues 
in the outgrower scheme have created new risks. 
There are pressures on food security as a result of 
a decline in land for food crops, and on incomes, 
particularly when outgrowers’ cane remains 
unharvested and farmers’ payments are delayed. 
These problems have been aggravated by the 
importation of foreign sugar into the country. 
For this industry to provide its maximum benefits 
to the economy and to the household, a policy, 
legal and institutional framework is needed that 
provides greater efficiency, accountability and 
transparency, as well as greater security for all 
participating stakeholders. There are lessons 
for the sugar industry, as well as donors and 
investors of ongoing and future agribusiness 
developments in Tanzania.
The strategic context
Kilombero Sugar Company is often 
mentioned as a success story in Tanzania’s 
sugar sector. Its model combining estate with 
small-scale outgrower production is set to be 
replicated, as increasing sugarcane production 
using outgrowers is a core component of the 
Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor project 
(SAGCOT), a public – private partnership focused 
on Tanzania’s south-central region. Large-scale 
sugar investments are also planned under 
Tanzania’s Big Results Now strategy. Under 
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in sugar, as well as rice and other crops, are 
envisaged for Kilombero District, where 
Kilombero Sugar Company already operates. 
Given that the government is proceeding with 
new sugar investments supported by foreign 
donors (see Box 1), it is crucial that lessons are 
learned from Kilombero so that objectives of 
food security, poverty alleviation, inclusive 
private sector development and national sugar 
self-sufficiency can be met. Presenting the 
results of fieldwork and building on findings 
and recommendations of other studiesi, this 
policy brief suggests priority actions to address 
a number of identified problems.
Developing SAGCOT is the focus of the strategy for Tanzania within the New Alliance for Food 
Security and Nutrition. The New Alliance is an initiative crafted by the G8 to reduce hunger and poverty 
in 10 African countries by increasing private sector investment in agriculture and scaling up innovation. 
Under Tanzania’s New Alliance framework, at least 19 companies have made investment commitments, 
mostly in the SAGCOT region; G8 members, such as the UK, have committed funds and matching 
grants; and the Tanzanian government has committed to 12 policy actions. Most of the policy actions 
relate to seeds, but the government also agreed to demarcate and certify village land in Kilombero 
District and the wider SAGCOT region to facilitate land acquisition and investment.ii








Horizontal expansion is limited by the presence of the Udzungwa mountain range.
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Tanzania’s sugar industry
Tanzania has only four companies which 
commercially produce sugarcane: Kilombero 
Sugar Company (KSCL) and Mtibwa Sugar 
Estates in Morogoro region, Tanganyika Planting 
Company (TPC) in Kilimanjaro region and Kagera 
Sugar in Kagera region. All the companies 
were privatised between 1998 and 2001. The 
government retained 25 percent stakes in two of 
them: KSCL, whose majority owner is the South 
African company Illovo Sugar (itself a subsidiary 
of Associated British Foods); and TPC, now 
majority owned by the Mauritian sugar group 
Alteo. Mtibwa Sugar Estates was acquired by the 
Tanzanian company Super Group, which also 
owns Kagera Sugar.
Since privatisation the industry has made 
significant gains in terms of capital investments, 
area under cane and revenue generated for 
the Treasury. Total production by the four 
companies climbed from a pre-privatisation 
level of 112,903t of sugar in 1995/96 to reach a 
peak of 304,135t in 2010/11.iii
Despite these strides, Tanzania still has an 
estimated annual sugar deficit of 220,000-
300,000t. The factories do not operate at full 
capacity, but even if production were increased 
through efficiency gains and agronomic 
improvements, the four companies would be 
unlikely to meet domestic demand.iv To address 
the deficit, the government waives or reduces 
tax on some imported sugar each year, has 
encouraged the millers to increase production 
and is attracting further investors into the sector. 
As per the Tanzania Sugar Industry Act of 
2001, the sugar industry is regulated by the 
Sugar Board of Tanzania (SBT), under the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives. 
SBT activities are overseen by a board of 
directors representing the Tanzania Sugar 
Producers’ Association (TSPA), the Tanzania 
Sugarcane Growers Association (TASGA), the 
consumer sector, the government and industry. 
Following growing tension between large and 
small growers’ associations, a new body – the 
Council of Cane Growers Association – has been 
formed.
Kilombero Sugar Company 
KSCL runs two irrigated estates totalling 
8,022ha and two factories at its base at Kidatu 
in Kilombero District. The largest of Tanzania's 
millers, it produced 116,495t of sugar in 2013/14, 
down from126,737t in 2012/13 and well below 
its annual target agreed with the government of 
200,000t.v It generates its own electricity from 
bagasse and an ethanol distillery is being built. 
While KSCL has made some efforts to expand 
vertically, potential for horizontal estate 
expansion is limited. It has therefore strongly 
encouraged outgrower production. The number 
of outgrowers increased from about 2,000 in 
1998 to 8,000 in 2013. With about 15,000ha 
under cane, outgrowers supply 43 percent of 
the cane crushed by the two mills. 
KSCL outgrowers must join a cane growers’ 
association and register with the TSB. Rather than 
outgrowers having individual contracts, a Cane 
Supply Agreement (CSA) is signed between the 
company and the farmers’ associations, of which 
there are 15. Farmers face starting costs such as 
seedcane and inputs, and some villagers do not 
have the necessary capital or land to participate, 
but it is a relatively inclusive scheme. Donors and 
funding agencies such as the EU and the World 
Bank have financed roads, capacity-building and 
other initiatives.


















Outgrowers' cane is cut by largely seasonal, migrant workers recruited by contractors. The South 
African firm Unitrans supplies cane-cutters for KSCL's estates.
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The deal for outgrowers
Under the CSA for the 2013–2016 period, 
KSCL pays outgrowers for the weight and 
sucrose content of their delivered cane, minus 
the costs of harvesting, transport, processing, 
marketing and distribution. The price per tonne 
paid to farmers is estimated at the start of each 
season and adjusted if necessary at season’s 
end in light of actual sale prices achieved for 
sugar and molasses. Outgrowers are paid a 
57 percent cut of these sale profits through a 
division of proceeds system. For the 2013/14 
season, the provisional price for farmers’ cane, 
before adjustment for sucrose level and actual 
sales, was TZS 58,000/tonne (US$35.6/tonne).
Association members cannot grow sugarcane 
for any buyer other than KSCL. The outgrowers 
own or rent their cane fields mostly under 
customary tenure, with few holding title 
deeds. Recently the SBT, in collaboration 
with Mkurabita, has begun formalising land 
farmed by outgrowers by issuing certificates 
of customary rights of occupancy as part of 
a programme to formalise people’s property 
assets to enable them to access loans which also 
supports Tanzania’s land certification objectives 
under the New Alliance. 
Research findings: positive gains, 
but growing challenges
Fieldwork was undertaken among outgrowers 
and other residents of three villages in Kilombero 
District in 2013 and 2014. The research project 
also included a document review and interviews 
with industry representatives and other key 
stakeholders. 
The most significant trend observed is the 
dramatic expansion of the outgrower scheme 
since KSCL was privatised in 1998. Expansion 
has allowed many more farming households 
to benefit from the proceeds of sugarcane. 
Farmers have used sugarcane payments to 
build better houses, finance other crops and 
educate their children. Well-off outgrowers 
have reinvested in businesses and there have 
been benefits at village level from collective 
farms and infrastructural improvements. The 
growth of subcontractors, ancillary businesses 
and outgrowers hiring farm workers has created 
positive economic linkages.
However, the situation for outgrowers has 
deteriorated in recent years. Incomes from 
sugarcane have declined owing to a drop in 
the producer price, low sucrose levels and 
some sugarcane remaining unharvested, 
leading in many cases to financial losses and 
indebtedness. Grievances with the current 
system are contributing to a splintering of the 
outgrowers’ representative associations. 
Sucrose and governance issues
The decline in sucrose content of cane 
is the major complaint among outgrowers. 
Farmers are regularly recording levels below 
the benchmark of ten percent. This negatively 
affects their payments, as the producer price is 
adjusted for sucrose, and so deductions take a 
proportionally larger slice of farmers’ incomes. 
Cane quality is being affected by ‘smut’ disease, 
white scale pest, harvesting taking place during 
the short rainy season and delays in cane being 
crushed after burning. Outgrowers also allege 
inaccuracy and bribery in measurement of 
sucrose at the factories. There is a serious lack 
of trust and transparency in the system; not only 
for sucrose measurement, but also in weighing 
cane deliveries and in calculating farmers’ 
payments. 
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Not enough guidance is being provided to 
help outgrowers raise sucrose levels and to 
oversee harvesting and crop management. 
Under the CSA, the company has no obligation to 
provide extension services. Some extension staff 
are employed by the company, the government 
and associations, but the coverage is insufficient. 
A 2012 study of outgrowers revealed a lack of 
training and access to extension officers.vi   Thus, 
the premise that private investors will provide 
technology and extension services (e.g. through 
SAGCOT)vii does not necessary hold true. Public 
services may be better provided by the state.viii 
Another widespread problem is outgrowers’ 
cane not being harvested in time, or failing 
to be harvested at all. A major reason is that 
outgrower production has overshot the capacity 
of KSCL’s factories. Harvesting schedules and 
haulage are disrupted by rains and cane fires, 
and the smallest outgrowers find themselves 
low down the pecking order. Farmers whose 
cane is not harvested during the season as 
expected experience a shortfall in income, 
which has consequences for the household 
and encourages indebtedness. Block farms have 
been introduced to offer a more collective and 
systematic system for small outgrowers, but 
there have been leadership problems and poor 
returns for participants.
Further issues in the governance of the 
outgrower scheme include a proliferation 
of outgrower associations, which could be 
contributing to a lack of organisation of 
harvesting. Associations lobby for large delivery 
quotas, which encourages over-production 
of cane, and there are signs of a lack of 
cooperation among them over, for example, 
road improvements.
Excessive importation of duty-free 
sugar 
Owing to Tanzania’s sugar deficit, some 
importers are permitted to bring sugar into the 
country without paying the full duty. Exemptions 
are awarded after the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Food Security and Cooperatives, in collaboration 
with the SBT, has established the shortfall in 
domestic sugar production. Studies suggest a 
lack of control over the amount of foreign sugar 
Figure 1: State of sugar imports and exports in Tanzania
Source: Massimba et al. 2013ix 
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that is being licensed for import and the timing 
of its distribution within Tanzania, resulting in 
over-supply when the domestic crushing season 
begins. Further alleged problems are that cheap 
sugar imported for industrial use has been 
entering the domestic consumption market, 
and that traders are creating artificial scarcity 
by hoarding supplies or illegally exporting sugar. 
The problem of disproportionate importation 
was severe in 2011/12, as indicated in Figure 1.
The importation of sugar causes frustration 
among the domestic millers and association 
leaders, and badly hurts smallholder cane 
growers. During 2013, KSCL delayed payments 
to outgrowers because, it said, imports had 
affected its sugar sales in Tanzania and therefore 
its cash flow. Downward pressure on domestic 
sugar prices from cheap imports has also led the 
company to reduce the price paid to outgrowers 
for their cane.
Land and livelihood issues
Outgrower expansion and in-migration have 
contributed to land scarcity in the Kilombero 
area. Villagers complained that it is difficult to 
acquire farmland and that the predominance 
of sugarcane creates obstacles to cultivating 
food crops. Households have responded by 
acquiring farmland in other villages outside 
the sugarcane zone. This creates opportunities 
for farm labourers and individuals hiring out 
tractors in those distant villages, but it also 
presents challenges for families travelling to 
and from the farms. In some families, household 
members are spending substantial time at the 
distant farms to do manual farm work, and 
many schoolchildren are being left home alone, 
unsupervised. Problems such as truancy and 
teenage pregnancy are reported.
There have been concurrent challenges in 
the rice market. Many outgrowers cultivate 
paddy in addition to sugarcane for household 
consumption and for sale. And for those villagers 
who are unable to participate in outgrowing, 
paddy farming can be a major livelihood. 
Villagers reported a rise in the cost of paddy 
farming (especially inputs) and a dramatic fall 
in the market price of rice, related to a lack 
of government support over marketing and 
exports at the national level. During 2013, the 
price that farmers in the local area received for 
one sack of rice fell from TZS 100,000 (US$61) 
in 2012 to TZS 40,000–50,000 (US$25–30). The 
poor returns from alternative crops means that 
outgrowers can feel trapped, as one woman 
In early 2010, SBT commissioned Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) to undertake a diagnostic 
study of the organizational structure of sugarcane outgrowers in Tanzania and make proposals for 
improvements. Among REPOA’s recommendations was the establishment of effective and robust 
area-based trusts. These trusts would perform the functions of the currently considered weak associations, 
from cultivation to transport, in more coherent geographical areas. Trust members would have business 
and agronomic knowledge. REPOA’s suggested reforms have not been implemented. 
KSCL has been sourcing donor funding to finance outgrower infrastructure and capacity-building 
of associations. In collaboration with the Dutch NGO Solidaridad, it has recently contracted the outgrower 
development consultants RMI to provide industry support and capacity-building. Solidaridad also 
aims to redraft the Cane Supply Agreement into more accessible language and translate it into Swahili. 
Box 2. Stakeholder initiatives
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commented: ‘We continue [with sugarcane] — 
there’s no way out. We just hope that one day 
things will improve.’ 
In recent years, SBT and the company have 
started to seek solutions to emerging outgrower 
problems (see Box 2). 
What needs to be done in the sugar 
industry?
There are many ways of improving the 
current situation. Responding to the urgent 
need for reforms, this briefing offers priority 
actions for the Kilombero area (applicable to 
the sugar industry at large), as well as possible 
implications for future developments under 
SAGCOT and Big Results Now.
1. Improve the oversight functions of 
parliament and district and village 
councils in order to increase accountability 
from national to village level and throughout 
the supply chain and to ensure that the 
country's laws pertaining to the sugar 
industry are enforced and other programmes 
implemented. Parliamentarians are 
responsible for checking the performance of 
the government at both national and local 
levels, while councilors can play a significant 
role in monitoring the performance 
of district officials such as agricultural 
extension officers. 
2. Increase the provision of extension 
services and training to outgrowers, 
ensuring that all registered outgrowers 
can be reached. Smut disease should be 
one of the topics covered. In Kilombero, the 
current piecemeal provision of extension 
services by the company, the government 
and individual associations should be 
streamlined and strengthened.
3. Establish transparent and participatory 
systems  for weighing outgrowers’ 
deliveries, measuring sucrose content and 


















Private contractors' trucks deliver outgrowers' sugarcane for crushing at KSCL's two mills.
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and liability regarding payment delays, force 
majeure events, factory disruptions and the 
failure to harvest growers’ cane. Implement 
the proposal to simplify cane supply 
agreements (CSAs) and translate them 
into Swahili, the national language. State 
clearly all the sugar products from which 
the outgrowers are entitled payments (e.g. 
sugar, molasses, bagasse, ethanol, etc). CSAs 
should be distributed to all outgrowers and 
the clarity of outgrowers’ pay slips should 
also be improved. This may be done through 
discussions and negotiations between 
millers, TASGA/Cane Growers Council and 
independent legal advisers acting on behalf 
of outgrowers.
4. Enhance accountability, responsibility 
and transparency of the SBT, the millers 
and outgrowers’ leadership. Parties that 
fail to fulfil their responsibilities should be 
penalised according to existing laws and 
agreements; new penalties or incentives 
may be introduced to ensure fairness and 
sustainability of the sugar business. In 
Kilombero, enforce provisions in the CSA 
regarding the condition of haulage trucks 
and discuss possible measures to prevent 
harvesting schedules being disrupted by 
cane fires and alleged bribery. Increase 
the capacity of associations to carry out 
the scheduling process and their overall 
responsibility for delivering the cane of 
their members. Associations should employ 
qualified managers to run the operational 
parts of their mandates. Ensure that the 
donor community, particularly the EU, does 
thorough monitoring of funded projects 
(road improvements and block farms) as 
part of its accompanying measures for 
former Sugar Protocol countries.
5. Provide sufficient public and private 
investment under strict and transparent 
management. Core investments could 
include construction and maintenance of 
roads, water irrigation canals and water 
drainage systems. The donor support for 
the development of infrastructure is critical, 
but its sustainability is unclear given the 
dwindling donor contribution on national 
budget. The current arrangement for KSCL 
outgrowers to pay two sets of deductions 
for infrastructure, one to cover roads in 
their association’s locality and the other to 
contribute to all supporting roads, is fueling 
conflicts and mistrust among them. It is thus 
ideal for this to remain mainly the function 
of the state through cane growers’ taxes and 
other state resources. 
6. Improve the planning, management and 
monitoring of outgrower production. 
Conduct research into the viability of block 
farms as a means of supporting small-
scale outgrowers and protecting their 
participation within schemes. In addition, 
multi-stakeholder consultations should 
take place on long-term solutions to the 
problem of over-production at Kilombero 
and prevent it occurring elsewhere. Options 
may include decreasing associations’ quotas 
and introducing incentives, assurances 
and penalties to increase the efficiency 
and capacity of milling factories. Carry out 
initiatives to raise local awareness of the 
production risks of sugarcane outgrowing 
and plan for zones for both cane and food 
crops in the supply areas. Provide multi-
stakeholder planning and support for small-
scale farmers who wish to exit sugarcane 
and transition to another crop, and consider 
measures to bolster small-scale rice and 
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other food-crop production and marketing 
more generally, including beyond the 
outgrower zones. 
7. Put in place an effective, participatory 
and transparent framework for issuing 
sugar import licences and permits with 
or without tax remissions, to be adhered 
to by all stakeholders in the industry. Any 
firm or individual that imports above the 
agreed quota, whether legally or illegally, 
must be prosecuted and the excess sugar 
should be deported to avoid market 
distortion. Establish a more thorough 
auditing mechanism to determine domestic 
supply needs and available stocks before 
import permits are issued. Make public 
any deviations from audit findings and 
improve the coordination and timeliness of 
distribution. Given the likely continuation 
of the national sugar deficit, introduce 
measures to manage millers’ cash flow 
problems related to importation and prevent 
costs being passed on to outgrowers and 
other vulnerable members of the supply 
chain such as cane-cutters.
What should be done under 
SAGCOT and Big Results Now?
Lessons can be drawn from the research 
for investors, planners and other stakeholders 
of future sugarcane outgrower schemes and 
other large-scale agribusiness developments 
under SAGCOT and Big Results Now. The key 
recommendations are:
1. Emulate and improve on successful 
elements of the KSCL outgrower scheme. 
These include: the division of sugar proceeds 
payment structure; relatively low barriers to 
entry for poor and women farmers; a fluid 
land rental market; and the entrepreneurial 
spirit among the residents.
2. Ensure that outgrower contracts give small 
producers adequate protection from force 
majeure events, cane fires and other shocks 
and that these contracts are translated into 
a locally understood language (Swahili).
3. Create thorough and participatory land-use 
plans which identify and protect land for 
staple food crop cultivation, grazing and 
other activities in addition to sugarcane 
production. To protect resource access and 
local food production, put limits in place if 
necessary in terms of acreage under cane 
or absolute numbers of outgrowers.
4. Ensure that an adequate road network 
will be in place to ensure all-season access 
to farmers’ fields, factories and market 
destinations.
5. Reconsider the proportion of funding 
allocated under SAGCOT and Big Results 
Now for supporting large-scale commercial 
agribusinesses and nucleus–outgrower 
schemes. In the KSCL case, it is clear that 
support for paddy farming is needed 
alongside specific measures for sugarcane 
outgrowers. Given that the very smallest 
and poorest farmers are often unable to 
participate in outgrower schemes, and that 
outgrower schemes are in any case limited 
in the numbers of farmers that they can 
include, it may be more effective to allocate 
more effort and funding into broader 
sectoral development of rural economies 
through provision of storage, marketing and 
price support, affordable credit and so on. 
6. Carefully consider the share of responsibilities 
and risks among firms, associations or 
cooperatives, subcontractors and farmers. 
Through theory-based planning and 
stakeholder engagement, ensure that 
capacity is in place for the provision of 
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services and that the business model 
will not engender corruption or perverse 
incentives.
7. In public–private partnerships, make 
explicit the roles for the state, firms and 
donors, particularly in regard to provision 
of extension services, credit and inputs, 
provision and maintenance of infrastructure, 
and farmer representation.
Without understanding and acknowledging 
capacity constraints, the interplay between 
actors and the political-economic context, the 
potential of initiatives such as the expansion of 
Tanzania’s sugar industry to reach food security 
and poverty reduction goals is limited. It is crucial 
that plans are grounded in existing experience. 
We kindly thank Ruth Hall and Ian Scoones for their constructive 
comments on the earlier version of this policy brief.
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